A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure that compresses an arbitrary block of numerical data and returns a fixed-size bit string. There exists many hash functions: MD5, HAVAL, SHA, ... It was reported that these hash functions are no longer secure. Our work is focused on the construction of a new hash function based on composition of functions. The construction used the NP-completeness of Threedimensional contingency tables and the relaxation of the constraint that a hash function should also be a compression function.
Introduction
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure that compresses an arbitrary block of data and returns fixed-size bit string, the hash value (message digest or digest). An accidental or intentional change of the data will almost certainly change the hash value. Hash functions are used to verify the integrity of data or data signature. Let us suppose that h : X → Y is a hash function without key. The function h is secured if the following three problems are difficult to solve.
Problem 1: First Preimage attack
Instance: a function h : X → Y and an image y ∈ Y Query:
x ∈ X such that h(x) = y
We suppose that a possible hash y is given, we want to know if there exists x such that h(x) = y. If we can solve First Preimage attack, then (x, y) is a valid pair. A hash function for which First Preimage attack can't be solved efficiently is sometimes called Preimage resistant.
Problem 2: Second Preimage attack
Instance: a function h : X → Y and an element x 1 ∈ X Query: x 2 ∈ X such that x 1 = x 2 and h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 )
A message x 1 is given, we want to find a message x 2 such that x 2 = x 1 and h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 ). If this is possible, then (x 2 , h(x 1 )) is a valid pair. A function for which Second preimage attack can't be solve efficiently is sometimes called Second preimage resistant.
Problem 3: Collision attack
Instance: a function h : X → Y Query: x 1 , x 2 ∈ X such that x 1 = x 2 and h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 ) We want to known if it is possible to find two distinct messages x 1 and x 2 such that h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 ). A function for which Collision attack can't be solve efficiently is sometimes called Collision resistant.
There exists many hash functions: MD4, MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, RIPEMD, HAVAL. It was reported that such widely hash functions are no longer secured [7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] . Thus, new hash functions should be studied. The existing hash functions such as MD4, MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, RIPEMD, HAVAL... want to achieve two goals at the same time: Our contribution is to separate the two goals defined in points a • ) and b • ). Our hash function H 3 is defined as follows:
• H 2 is a classical hash function such as MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, RIPEMD, HAVAL, ....
• Given a y, find x such that H 1 (x) = y is NP-Complete,
• For any input x, the length of H 1 (x) is not fixed. This is the main difference with the classical hash functions.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, some preliminaries are presented. Section 3 is devoted to the design of our hash function. Concluding remarks are stated in Section 4.
Preliminaries
Let's define some preliminaries useful for the next section.
Two-dimensional
Data security in two dimension have been studied by many authors [2, 3, 9, 17] . Let m and n be two positive integers, and let R = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m ) and S = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) be non-negative integral vectors. Denoted by A(R, S) the set of all m × n matrices A = (a ij ) satisfying a ij = 0 or 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , m and j = 1, 2, . . . , n;
Thus a matrix of 0's and 1's belongs to A(R, S) provided its row sum vector is R and its column sum vector is S. The set A(R, S) was studied by many authors [1, 4, 5, 6, 16] . Ryser [16] has defined an interchange to be a transformation which replaces the 2 × 2 submatrix :
of a matrix A of 0's and 1's with the 2 × 2 submatrix
If the submatrix B 0 (or B 1 ) lies in rows k, l and columns u, v, then we call the interchange a (k, l; u, v) -interchange. An interchange (or any finite sequence of interchanges) does not alter the row and column sum vectors of a matrix. Ryser has shown the following result.
Theorem 1 [16] Let A and A * be two m and n matrices composed of 0's and 1's, possessing equal row sum vectors and equal column sum vectors. Then A is transformable into A * by a finite number of interchanges.
Let us consider a matrix A ∈ {0, 1} n×n ∈ A(R, S), i.e. its row sum vector R is such that R ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} n and its column sum vector S is such that S ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} n . We define the function g 1 from {0, 1} n×n to N 2n as follows:
where denotes the concatenation.
Three-dimensional
Irving and Jerrum [15] have studied the extension of the problem in three dimension and shown that problems that are solvable in polynomial time in the two-dimensional case become NP-Complete. Suppose that for a given n × n × n table D of non-negative integers, and for each i, j, k, the row, column and file sums are denoted by R(i, k), C(j, k) and F (i, j) respectively. In other words:
The following problem is studied by Irving and Jerrum [15] :
Problem 4. Three-dimensional contingency tables (3DCT) Instance: A positive integer n, and for each i, j, k non-negative integers values R(i, k), C(j, k) and F (i, j) Question: Does there exist an n × n × n contingency table X of nonnegative integers such that:
for all i, j, k ? Irving and Jerrum show the following result:
Corollary 1 [15] 3DCT is NP-Complete, even in the special case where all the row, column and file sums are 0 or 1.
Let us consider a matrix A ∈ N n×n×n such that its row sum matrix is a matrix R such that R ∈ N n×n (i.e. R(i, k) ∈ N) , the column sum matrix is a matrix C such that C ∈ N n×n (i.e. C(j, k) ∈ N) and the file sum matrix is a matrix F such that F ∈ N n×n (i.e. F (i, j) ∈ N). We define the function g 2 as follows:
Let us consider the following matrices A and B. We define the element product of matrices A and B as follows:
Definition 1 Element Product of Matrices of dimension 2 Let A, B ∈ R n1×n2 , we define the Element product of matrices A and B as follows:
Definition 2 Element Product of Matrices of dimension 3 Let A, B ∈ R n1×n2×n3 , we define the Element product of matrices A and B as follows:
Design of the hash function
Before the construction of our hash function, let us explain the main idea.
Explanation of the idea by an example
In page 175 of paper [1] , Brualdi gives the example of the following five matrices: 
It is easy to verify that (3, 3) . All these differences imply that
• the second term of g 1 (A 1 . * W ) is not equal to the second term of
• the third term of g 1 (A 1 . * W ) is not equal to the third term of g 1 (A 2 . * W ),
• the fifth term of g 1 (A 1 . * W ) is not equal to the fifth term of g 1 (A 2 . * W ),
• the sixth term of g 1 (A 1 . * W ) is not equal to the sixth term of g 1 (A 2 . * W ).
More formally, from the construction of g 1 , we can deduce easily that if
• ) the i-th term of g 1 (A . * W ) would probably be different from the i-th term of g 1 (B . * W ), d
• ) the (n+j)-th term of g 1 (A . * W ) would probably be different from the (n+j)-th term of g 1 (B . * W ).
From the fact that 3DCT which is related to g 2 (this is an extension of g 1 ) is NP-Complete, we deduce that: e
• ) Given y and a matrix W , find a matrix A such that g 2 (A . * W ) = y is NP-Complete.
Our idea is to build a new hash function H 3 such that H 3 = H 2 oH 1 where
• H 2 is a classical hash function such as MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, RIPEMD, HAVAL,...
• H 1 is a function which exploits the ideas presented in c
Let us denote V Ones(n) the vector such that V Ones(n) ∈ {0, 1} n and each of its elements is equal to 1. Also, let us denote M Ones(n) the matrix such that M Ones(n) ∈ {0, 1} n×n and each of its elements is equal to 1. in other words:
We denote N + the set of strictly positive natural number defined as follows:
In the next sub-section, we formalize the observation made in points c
• ) and d
• ) and we take into account the NP-Completeness of 3DCT to build a new hash function.
Construction of the new hash function
For any integers a and p such that 0 ≤ a ≤ −1 + 2 p , let us denote bin(a, p) the decomposition of the integer a in base 2 on p positions. In other words:
Let us also define the following function:
represents the number of bits necessary to represent any integer between 0 and n in base 2.
We also define the following functions:
f 4 (A) represents the maximun of sum of any n consecutive elements of the matrix A belonging to the same row, or to the same column or to the same file. f 0 of 4 (A) represents the number of bits necessary to represent in base 2 the sum of any n consecutive elements of the matrix A belonging to the same row, or to the same column, or to the same file.
Subsequently, in the aim to be more precise, we redefine g 2 as follows:
Let us define the following problem:
Problem 5:
Instance: A positive integer n, two binary strings x and y two matrices V, W ∈ N n×n×n Query: Find two matrices A, B ∈ {0, 1} n×n×n such that:
Let us characterize the complexity of P roblem5.
Proposition 1 Problem 5 is NP-Complete.
Proof Idea of Proposition 1:
We want to show how to transform a solution of 3DCT to a solution of Problem 5 . Without loss of generality, we work in dimension 2. Let us suppose that we want to find a matrix A ∈ {0, 1} 3×3 such that:
where R = (3, 2, 1) and C = (2, 3, 1). It is easy to see that the determination of the matrix A ∈ {0, 1} 3×3 which verifies Equations (1) is also equivalent to determining the matrix B ∈ {0, 1} 6×6 such that:
where Rd = (3, 2, 1, 3, 2, 1) and Cd = (2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1). Remark 1: Rd ( respectively Cd ) is a duplication of R ( respectively C ). It is easy to see that from the matrix: (2). This is the idea of the transformation which associates to one solution of the problem defined in Equations (1) two distinct solutions of the problem defined in Equations (2). Before the proof, let us introduce the function duplic (which is pseudo-duplication ) of x. We note:
where x(i) ∈ {0, 1} and p = 3 × n 2 × ⌈log 2 (n + 1)⌉. We define the function t as follows:
The function duplic is defined as follows:
duplic(x, n) =dcopy(x, 1, n)||dcopy(x, 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, n, n)|| dcopy(x, 1, n)||dcopy(x, 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, n, n)|| dcopy(x, n + 1, n)||dcopy(x, n + 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, 2n, n)|| dcopy(x, n + 1, n)||dcopy(x, n + 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, 2n, n)|| dcopy(x, 2n + 1, n)||dcopy(x, 2n + 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, 3n, n)|| dcopy(x, 2n + 1, n)||dcopy(x, 2n + 2, n)|| . . . ||dcopy(x, 3n, n) where dcopy(x, i, n) is defined as follows:
dcopy(x, i, n) = strcopy(x, i, n)||strcopy(x, i, n) and strcopy(x, i, n) = x(1 + t(i − 1, n))x(2 + t(i − 1, n)) . . .
x(t(i, n))
For illustration, duplic(x, 3) is defined as follows:
duplic(x, 3) =x(1) . . . x(6)x(1) . . . x(6)x(7) . . . x(12)x(7) . . . x (12) 
x(54)
Remark 2: In the definition of strcopy(x, i, n), the term x(1+t(i−1, n))x(2+ t (i − 1, n) ) . . . x(t(i, n) ) means the concatenation of all the elements between x(1 + t(i − 1, n)) and x(t(i, n)). In other words:
Proof of Proposition 1 : It suffices to show that 3DCT ≤ P m P roblem 5.
Let us suppose that the procedure Generalize solves Problem 5 and we want to show how to build a procedure Sol3DCT which solves 3DCT. The procedure Sol3DCT takes as input a binary string x, an integer n and returns as output the matrix A of size n such that g 2 (A) = x. The procedure Generalize takes as input:
• p the dimension of the matrices
• two binary strings x and y
• two matrices V and W and returns as output:
• two matrices C and D such that:
We show in the procedure below how to use Generalize as a subroutine to solve Sol3DCT .
Procedure Sol3DCT( n : integer , x : string , var A : matrix ) ; V, W , C , D : matrix p , i , j , k : integer z : string begin 1:
Generalize(p, z, z, V, W, C, D) 6:
For i = 1 to n do 7: For j = 1 to n do 8:
For k = 1 to n do 9:
n×n×n , whereas the matrices C, D belong to the set {0, 1} 2n×2n×2n .
The string z of the procedure Sol3DCT (see instruction 3) is constructed such that g 2 (A) = x if and only if the matrices C and D defined in Equations (5) and (6) are the solutions of Problem 5 with the following entries:
• 2n the dimension of the matrices,
• two binary strings z and z,
• two matrices V and W such that V = M ones(2n) , W = M ones(2n).
The terms of the matrix C are:
The terms of the matrix D are:
The main idea of the design of the Collision-resistant hash function H 3 is that:
• the hash function H 3 is the composition of two functions H 1 and H 2 ,
• the function H 1 is a function for which Problem 1, Problem 2 and Problem 3 can't be solved efficiently and H 1 is not a compression function.
• H 2 is a hash function such as SHA-256, RIPEMD, or HAVAL, ....
Notation 1
Let us consider two vectors V 1 and V 2 . We say that V 1 is not a linear combination of V 2 and we note V 1 is NLC of V 2 if and only if ∃ α ∈ R such that V 1 = αV 2 .
Two matrices F, G ∈ N n×n×n + verify the hypotheses (7) if and only if :
∀i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the vector F(i, j, * ) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n) (7e)
∀j, k such that 1 ≤ j, k ≤ n, the vector F( * , j, k) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n) (7f)
∀i, k such that 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n, the vector F(i, * , k) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n) (7g)
∀i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the vector G(i, j, * ) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n) (7h)
∀j, k such that 1 ≤ j, k ≤ n, the vector G( * , j, k) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n) (7i)
∀i, k such that 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n, the vector G(i, * , k) is NLC of the vector VOnes(n)
The matrices V and W used as entries in the procedures H 1 and H 3 below verify the hypotheses defined by Equations (7). We note ǫ the empty chain. Let us define the function V ectM at which takes as input a vector V ect of size n 3 and returns as output an equivalent matrix A of size n × n × n.
Procedure V ectM at (Vect : Var i, j, k , t : integer Begin t ← 1 For i = 1 to n do For j = 1 to n do For k = 1 to n do A(i, j, k) ← V ect(t) t ← t + 1 endfor endfor endfor End
The function H 1 is defined as follows:
Entry. M 0 the initial message V : Table[ 
Our hash function H 3 is defined as the composition of the function H 1 and H 2 , where H 2 is a hash function such as SHA-256, RIPEMD, HAVAL... The matrices V and W used as entry in the hash function H 3 must verify the hypotheses defined in Equations (7). To obtain the hash of the message M 0 by H 3 , we proceed as follows:
• we obtain the intermediate message M 2 by application of the function H 1 to the message M 0 ,
• by application of the hash function H 2 to M 2 , we build the hash of the initial message.
Formally, the hash function is defined as follows:
We can represent roughly the function H 1 as follows:
g2(A.*W) g2(A.*V) • the aim of the branches (1) and (2) is to make that the Problem 2 and Problem 3 are difficult to solve efficiently for the function H 3
• the aim of the branch (6) is to make sure that Problem 1 is difficult to solve efficiently for the function H 3
During some attacks, an adversary is needed to solve the following problem: Problem 6: Instance: Matrices A, V, W Binary strings : g 2 (A . * V ) and g 2 (A . * W ) Query: Find a matrix B such that A = B and:
Based on Problem 5, we deduce that P roblem 6 is NP-Complete.
Second Preimage attack and Collision of the function H 3 are difficult because:
• Problem 5 and Problem 6 are NP-Complete,
• From the fact that V and W verify the hypotheses (7), we deduce that if we take two matrices A and B such that A = B, then we would probably have g 2 (A . * V )||g 2 (A . * W ) = g 2 (B . * V )||g 2 (B . * W ).
First Preimage attack of the function H 3 is difficult because the 3DCT is NPComplete. Truncated differential attack of H 1 is possible, but the differential attack of H 3 is difficult because 3DCT is NP-Complete and also Problem 5 is NP-Complete.
Numerical Simulation
Let's consider the two messages x1 and x2 : x1 =d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698af f 95c 2f cab58712467eab4004583eb8f b7f 89 55ad340609f 4b30283e488832571415a 085125e8f 7cdc99f d91dbdf 280373c5b d8823e3156348f 5bae6dacd436c919c6 dd53e2b487da03f d02396306d248cda0 e99f 33420f 577ee8ce54b67080a80d1e c69821bcb6a8839396f 9652b6f f 72a70 x2 =d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698af f 95c 2f cab50712467eab4004583eb8f b7f 89 55ad340609f 4b30283e4888325f 1415a 085125e8f 7cdc99f d91dbd7280373c5b d8823e3156348f 5bae6dacd436c919c6 dd53e23487da03f d02396306d248cda0 e99f 33420f 577ee8ce54b67080280d1e c69821bcb6a8839396f 965ab6f f 72a70
We have MD5(x1)=MD5(x2)= EFE502F744768114B58C8523184841F3 after applying our hash function on these messages using n = 8,
[k] = 700 − (j + 8 * k + 64 * i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n we obtain: H 3 (x1)= 5fe0e56f9a4ab66a47d73ce660a2c4eb and H 3 (x2) = 620e2f3cfe0afc403c0a8343173526fc. It follows that M D5(x1) = M D5(x2) whereas H 3 (x1) = H 3 (x2).
Conclusion
From a classical hash function H 2 , we have built a new hash function H 3 from which First Preimage attack, Second Preimage attack and Collision attack are difficult to solve. Our new hash function is a composition of functions. The construction used the NP-completeness of Three-dimensional contingency tables and the relaxation of the constraint that a hash function should also be a compression function. The complexity of our new hash function increases with regard to the complexity of classical hash functions.
